I am currently Microsoft Employee, however the postings on this protect usb site are my thoughts and not necessarily those of my employer.
The principles of the present invention will be described more fully hereinafter with reference to preferred embodiments thereof. It should be noted, however, that these embodiments are provided usb protect by way of example, and not by way of limitation, and that the embodiments disclosed herein may be modified in form and detail without departing from the principles and scope of the invention.
I think the idea is that you have a virus in the USB firmware that propagates itself to executables that are copied over, and then which, once inside a host system memory, implants whatever malware payload – including, of course, code to overwrite the firmware of new USB devices that come along. Various remote offline and online controls verify the authenticity of actual codes and check for memory attacks and code-injection scenarios. The solution is to put some kind of MMU between the peripheral usb access control DMA controler and the system memory -and other devices- such that fine grained lock down can be achived by the OS (providing the OS supplier support/allows it). Given the advancement of today’s programming technology, it should be easy to build a mechanism that prevents or controls authenticated access via safe mode-Griffin Technologies has already proven that it can be done. Like Datakey, Griffin’s custom client function affords broad cross-platform support for Windows, Novell and nix.